It has recently been claimed that certain aspects of mental processing cannot be simulated by computers, even in principle. The argument is examined and a lacuna is identified.
Introduction Roger Penrose has recently published an argument
1 that seeks to establish that mathematicians, when they come to know mathematical truths, cannot in all cases be relying solely on processes that can be adequately simulated by idealized computers. Within the framework of science this is a startling claim, for contemporary mainstream scientific thought holds that mental processing insofar as it leads to overt behaviour is an aspect of physical processes happening mainly in the brain, and that these processes are governed by the mathematical laws of classical and quantum physics, and hence should be able to be simulated to arbitrary accuracy, at least in principle, by computers, provided no practical limitations whatsoever are imposed. Penrose's argument seeks to refute this. Moreover, the argument is claimed to be close to rigorous. Thus it is claimed, in effect, that almost rigorous argumentation is able to demolish some tenets of mainstream scientific thought, and to demonstrate that fundamentally new ideas are therefore required. This conclusion, if valid, would be a breakthrough of major importance in science.
Penrose's Argument
1. Let C q (n), for q ranging over some infinite set R q , be a listing of all computational processes that depend on one natural-number argument n. For each pair (q, n) the computational process C q (n) either stops, or never stops. (Example. C 7 (n) might be: Find the smallest integer N ≥ 0 that is not a sum of n numbers each of which is a square of a natural number, 0, 1, 2, 3, .... For n ≥ 4 no systematic search for N will ever stop, according to a theorem due to Lagrange) 2. Proceed by reductio ad absurdum: Assume that if, for some pair (q, n), we can know that C q (n) can never stop then we can know this only by means of some reasoning processes that, because it is the reflection of an underlying brain process, can be assumed to be a computational process that yields an answer, and thus stops (because it can be programmed to stop when it yields an answer). Thus the reductio ad absurdum assumption is that if, for some pair (q, n), we can know that C q (n) can never stop then there must be some computational process A(q, n) such that:
'A(q, n) stops' implies 'C q (n) can never stop'.
3. If A(q, n) is defined for every pair (q, n) (see below) then A(n, n) is a computational process that depends on one argument, n. Then there must be an index k such that:
A(n, n) = C k (n).
4. Therefore, according to the assumption of line 2,
5. Therefore,
6. But (by line 3) C k (k) = A(k, k), and hence (by line 5) 'A(k, k) can never stop'.
7. Thus we have found out that 'C k (k) can never stop', yet the knowledge that 'C k (k) can never stop' is not entailed by line 2.
8. We conclude that the A(k, k) occurring in line 2 for the case (q, n) = (k, k) is not unique: there must be an A 1 (k, k) = A(k, k) whose stopping entails that 'C k (k) never stops'. (Penrose specifies that the stopping of A(q, n) is merely a sufficient condition for C(q, n) never to stop, not a necessary and sufficient one. Hence there might be several different processes A m (k, k) any one of which could serve as the A(k, k) in line 2.)
9. If there were only a finite number of processes A m (k, k) such that the stopping of any one of them would allow us to know that C k (k) can never stop then one could define the A(k, k) in line 2 to be the process that stops if and only if any one of these A m (k, k)'s stops. Then one would get the desired contradiction: We would know (by line 5) that 'C k (k) can never stop', yet (by line 6) that the unique computational process whose stopping would (according to line 2) allows us to know this fact can never stop.
Penrose 1 has argued that all of the A m (q, n) whose stoppings can allow us to know that C ( q, n) can never stop, as specified in line 2, can indeed be amalgamated into one single A(q, n). In this case, the assumption in line 2 becomes: for any pair (p, n), if " 'C p (n) can never stop' is knowable" then "A(q, n) stops", and, conversely, for any pair (p, n), if "A(p, n) stops" then " ' C(p, n) can never stop' is knowable" Thus we have the equivalence: for every pair (p, n),
Since whatever is knowable is (presumably) true the argument can then proceed as indicated above, with a contradiction appearing after line 6. However, there is a question about line 3, to which we now turn.
Indices and Arguments
Let us consider a set of processes S q (n), where q ranges over an infinite set R q . It is useful to make a distinction between an index, represented by a subscript, and an argument, represented by a variable enclosed by parentheses. The dependence on an argument is supposed to be one in which some finitelystated rule covers the infinite set of values that the argument (for example, the natural number n) is allowed to take on, whereas the dependence on an index is supposed to be one that is expressed by means of a case-by-case listing of the infinite set of individual cases. In the former case, the various possible values of the argument are elements of a coherent mathematical structure (e.g., the set of natural numbers), which makes it possible for one finitely-stated rule to cover the infinite number of possible values of the argument. But in the latter case the full identity of the index is specified, say, by its shape: the symbol is identified exclusively by an intrinsic identifying characteristic, not by means of the logical connections of this symbol to the other ones. Thus one could use *, !, ?, [, ... for these intrinsically characterized symbols, instead of 0, 1, 2, 3, ... , to indicate their lack of logical relatedness to one another.
The processes C q (n) were introduced by Penrose by listing all of the different computational processes C(n) that are functions of the single (natural-number) argument n:
This way of introducing the set of C q (n) might suggest that q is an index, and hence that, in my notation, it is properly written as a subscript, which is how Penrose writes it.
In this case, where the set of all possible C q (n) is indexed by the set of subscripts q, where q ranges over a set R q of pure symbols, the set of processes A(q, n) should be written rather as A q (n): the set of symbols q would be merely a set of indices, each of which has an identity, but no logical relationship (apart from 'different from') to the others. Hence no rule apart from direct case-by-case listing is possible for specifying the dependence on q.
If one were to adhere to this point of view, that the symbols q are merely indices, then Penrose's argument would collapse. For, it would make no sense to say that a pure symbol, say * , is equal to some natural number n. If one were, in spite of this logical point, simply to set up a convention whereby the pure symbols were represented by natural numbers in some haphazard way then one could not expect to derive anything useful. One could then, to be sure, formally consider the set of processes A n (n), as n runs over the set of natural numbers. But this set could not coincide, for some k, with the set of C k (n)'s, for all n, because the dependence of A n (n) upon the subscript n is not of the argument type, whereas for each value of q the dependence of C q (n) upon n is of the argument type, by definition. Thus a key step in Penrose's argument, namely line 3, would fail.
Penrose certainly recognized that he would not obtain a valid argument if the symbol q were an index-type of variable: he specified that q must be regarded as an argument-type of variable, but did so without ever writing down C(q, n). Once one writes C(q, n) instead of C q (n) a question immediately arises: How can one confirm that there is, in fact, a computational process C(q, n) that depends on two arguments, and has the property that, as q runs over the natural numbers, the process C(q, n) runs over the complete set of processes that are functions of the other argument n? Specifically, if the set of all computable processes of one (natural number) argument n is the set of C p (n), with p running over its range R p , then how does one construct a finitely described computational process C(q, n) that acts on two (natural-number) arguments q and n, such that for every p in R p there is a natural number q p such that C(q p , n) = C p (n).
Penrose
1 answers this question satisfactorily. He considers a Gödel-type of construction whereby one imagines that there is some rule whereby the sequence of mathematical symbols that expresses the form of each computational process C p (n) is transcribed into some corresponding natural number q p , in such a way that C p (n) = C(q p , n) for each p in R p .
Let it be granted, therefore, that C q (n) can, in my notation, be replaced by C(q, n). Then the computability assumption (that must be shown to lead to a contradiction) asserts that for every pair (q, n) such that " 'C(q, n) can never stop' is knowable" there is a computational process A q,n that stops and is such that: " 'A q,n stops' implies 'C(q, n) can never stop' ". This condition is the (reductio ad absurdum) assertion that the only way that one can know that 'C(q, n) can never stop' is by means of a mental process that can be represented by a computational process 1 .
To complete the proof described in section 2 one must show that set of processes A q,n can be represented in the form A(q, n); i.e., that the dependence of A q,n on the two indices q and n can be represented by an argument-type of dependence, not merely by an index-type dependence. An index-type of dependence is all that one is allowed to assume, ab initio, without begging the question.
A proof that this A q,n has the form A(q, n) would allow one to justify line 3 of the proof. However, the assumption that there exists a fixed finitely stated rule that maps the arguments (q, n) that identify any 'process C(q, n) that can be known never to stop' " onto "the process A by means of which it can be proved that C(q, n) never stops" is a far more mind-boggling idea than the result that is to be derived from this assumption. If it were true, it would mean that the search for solutions of the various diverse and difficult individual problems in number theory could in principle be avoided: there would exist a fixed finitelystated rule that maps the numbers that identify the problem to be solved (if it can be solved) onto the very argument by means of which it can be solved. The existence of such a general fixed finitely-stated rule for solving all of the soluable problems in number theory goes far beyond what can reasonably be expected.
What this means is that the assumption that A q,n can be written in the form A(q, n) (i.e., that the dependence of the process A q,n on the variables q and n that identify C(q, n) is a fixed finitely-stated rule) begs the question: it must be proved, not assumed.
Gödelization
One might try to deal with this problem by exploiting the deep results obtained by K. Gödel 2 . In this connection it should be noted that the assumption in line 2 goes far beyond what was proved (in this connection) by Gödel, who claimed (in terms of the computer formulation used by Penrose) merely that the set K of n such that " 'process C(n, n) never stops' is provable" is characterized by the statement "C(k, n) stops", where k is some well defined number that is explicitly constructable within that formalism.
This diagonalized version of the assumption in line 2 is all that is really needed for the proof. So there is the possibility that a full Gödel-type argument might provide what is needed to complete the proof. But then Gödel's argument pertaining to what is provable on the basis of certain mathematical rules known to mathematicians must be carried over to what is knowable to human beings by virtue of hypothesized mechanical rules of brain process. These latter rules act at the atomic level, and they can never be known to human beings in the same way that mathematical rules are known to mathematicians: what is knowable to human beings rests on the coherency of what they are aware of, not on their understanding of their own brain processess.
What Penrose is trying to refute is the hypothesis that what is knowable to a human being is determined mechanically, in terms of brain activities that are governed by mechanical rules. Since what we can know is presumeably a mere surface activity of a far more extensive brain activity, it becomes important to distinguish what we know, or can know, from the more extensive activity upon which it rests. Within the computer framework that Penrose is using, a conceivable model of the mind/brain could be this: the brain activity is represented by a mechanical/computer activity that stops from time to time, and the output represents the conscious thought. This output is then fed back into the computer as the next input. The machine is designed to produce outputs at a fairly regular pace, and to terminate any procedure that does not give an output reasonably quickly: brains must get answers out expeditiously if the organism is to survive.
In applying a Gödel-type argument to this mind/brain system the analog of the mathematical rules in Gödel's work would be the rules that govern the activity of the brain. The conclusion of the Gödel-type argument (transcribed into the computer language) would be that there must be an allowed brain process P that can never stop in spite of the fact that no system operating according to the rules by which the brain operates could ever reach the conclusion that P can never stop.
So the problem is: How can we reach this conclusion if no system operating according to the rules that govern the actions of our brains could ever reach this conclusion?
Although the hypothesized mechanical rules that govern brain action use some elements of simple arithmetic, there is no need for them to use any process that depends upon the use of the concepts "for all n", or "there exists no n", or any other notion in which is imbedded the notion of infinity. The simple stepby-step approximate integration of the discretized forms of differential equations of classical and quantum physics does not encounter any need to answer infinite numbers of questions: the questions it encounters are of the finite kind, such as "what is 1+1 ?" In fact, every number that occurs in the constructive process of solving these finite-difference equations is a finite number, and these numbers, since they represent values that can occur in living brains, are restricted to certain finite domains. However, this does not mean that the finite output statements of these brains cannot include the finite strings of symbols that are used by mathematicians to express propositions of number theory that refer to infinite sets.
What happens to Gödel's proof if one replaces the mathematical rules that are used in his argument by a strictly finitistic arithmetic that contains no universal quantifiers such as "for all n . . . ", and that restricts all numbers to pre-specified finite sets. The answer is that the proof does not get off the ground, for it rests heavily on the concept of "for all n" and an unbounded domain for the natural numbers. Consequently, the assertion that there exists a k such that:
"C(k, k) stops" iff " 'C(k, k) can never stop' is knowable" cannot be proved within the finitistic type of model of the mind/brain described above. So this attempt to supply the missing relation A q,n = A(q, n) fails.
The finite-type computer B that simulates the mechanical activity of the human brain (and whose outputs at stopping points represent human thoughts) can be imbedded in a computer C whose rules of operation included implementation of the concept " for all n", and to which the Gödel/Turing argument can be applied. Then a (super-human) mind M that could comprehend both the rules of operation of C and also the logic of the Gödel/Turing proof would be able to compute a value k such that the following proposition P k is true:
where knowable C means knowable by virtue of the outputs of C. The mind M that knows that P k is true can know also that "X is knowable C " entails that "X is true", and can therefore conclude that "C(k, k) can never stop". Thus M can know more than what is knowable C . This is the analog of Gödel's theorem, and is not a contradiction. On the other hand, the human mathematician can know only the output of B. He will be able to reason, on the basis of what the hypothetical M is able to know, that there exists some k (unknowable to human beings) such that "C(k, k) can never stop". However, it has not been proved that the only way that he could know this is by virtue of the stopping of C(k, k). The stopping of C(k, k) may be the unique process in C whose stopping gives the strong result that " ' C(k, k) can never stop' is knowable C ", for the particular value of k that is specified by the Gödel/Turing argument. But no proof is offered that there can be no process in B whose stopping could establish the far weaker conclusion that "there exists a k such that P k is true", which is all that is known to the human mathematician. Indeed, the human mathematician reasons on the basis of the general assumptions and properties known to him, and these do not include any knowledge of the details of the construction of C. He obtains from his reasonings conclusions that do not refer to the specific details of the construction of C, and that are therefore far weaker than the strong conclusion available to M. Penrose does not show that there could be no process in B whose stopping would yield this far weaker conclusion. In the absence of such a demonstration no contradiction is established, and hence the reductio ad absurdum argument fails to go through.
